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Abstract
A mathematical theory is inconsistent if an “equality” is deducible in the theory, such that
the two sides of the “equality” are either quantities different in kind, or quantities with different
numerical values. We report an inconsistency found in probability theory (also referred to as measure-
theoretic probability). For probability measures induced by real-valued random variables, we deduce
an “equality” such that one side of the “equality” is a probability, but the other side is not. For
probability measures induced by extended random variables, we deduce an “equality” such that its
two sides are unequal probabilities. The deduced expressions are erroneous only when it can be
proved that measure-theoretic probability is a theory free from contradiction. However, such a proof
does not exist. The inconsistency appears only in the theory rather than in the physical world,
and will not affect practical applications as long as ideal events in the theory (which will not occur
physically) are not mistaken for observable events in the real world. Nevertheless, unlike known
paradoxes in mathematics, the inconsistency cannot be explained away and hence must be resolved.
The assumption of infinite additivity in the theory is relevant to the inconsistency, and may cause
confusion of ideal events and real events. As illustrated by an example in this article, since abstract
properties of mathematical entities in theoretical thinking are not necessarily properties of physical
quantities observed in the real world, mistaking the former for the latter may lead to misinterpreting
random phenomena observed in experiments with microscopic systems. Actually the inconsistency
is due to the notion of “numbers” adopted in conventional mathematics. A possible way to resolve
the inconsistency is to treat “numbers” from the viewpoint of constructive mathematics.
1 Introduction
A basic requirement in mathematics and its various applications is that the two sides of an equality
must be entities of the same kind [2]. Actually, all equalities proved in a consistent (i.e., contradiction-
free) theory satisfy the above requirement. In a mathematical theory, if an “equality” is deducible
such that its two sides are entities of different kinds, the theory is inconsistent. No one will consider
∗Corresponding author (alternative e-mail address: guanglli@hotmail.com). 2010 Mathematics Subject Classification:
Primary 60A05.
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quantities of different kinds (e.g., length and area) equal, even if their numerical values happen to be
identical. It is absurd even to ask whether quantities different in kind are equal, as they are calculated
according to different rules.
Physical quantities (i.e., quantities in the physical world) are usually modeled by quantities in
mathematics. For instance, many physical quantities are modeled by real-valued variables, functions
or parameters. Unlike physical quantities modeled by their mathematical counterparts, real numbers
themselves are pure numbers, which serve as one of the basic kinds of quantities in mathematics.
Mathematical quantities of different kinds follow different rules in calculation. Operations for pure
numbers are determined by the corresponding axioms (e.g., see [13]). In mathematics, however, not
all real-valued quantities are calculated according to the same rules. For example, probabilities are
values assigned by a probability measure to “events” modeled by measurable sets in a σ-algebra. One
cannot calculate probabilities in the same way as one calculates values of functions which have nothing
to do with “events”, even if such functions and probability measures have the same range. Similarly,
probabilities and pure numbers in the closed interval [0, 1] are also calculated according to different rules,
and hence belong to different kinds of quantities. A probability describes quantitatively how likely an
event will occur. No pure number conveys such information. Rules of calculation with pure numbers in
the interval [0, 1] are not necessarily subject to the constraints imposed on calculating probabilities.
As shown above, if two mathematical quantities both take real numbers as their values but are
calculated according to different rules, they are different in kind. Let Γ and Ψ denote two real-valued
expressions, which may be the limits of sequences (Γn)n≥1 and (Ψn)n≥1, respectively, where Γn = Ψn
for each n, and Γn and Ψn represent quantities of the same kind; but the quantity represented by Γ (or
Ψ) may or may not belong to those kinds of quantities represented by Γn (or Ψn). For Γ = Ψ, the basic
requirement mentioned at the beginning of this section reduces to a trite, necessary condition. We refer
to this condition as “presupposition of equality” and state it below.
Presupposition of equality. In a consistent mathematical theory, the two sides of Γ = Ψ represent
quantities of the same kind which are calculated based on the same rules. The rules are determined by
the kind of quantities to which Γ and Ψ belong.
The measure-theoretic foundations for probability theory were laid by Kolmogorov in 1933 [8]. Since
then, it has been postulated (somewhat implicitly) that measure-theoretic probability is a consistent
theory. However, the postulated consistency of the theory appears to be incompatible with the presup-
position of equality. In this article, we report an inconsistency of measure-theoretic probability. For
probability measures induced by real-valued random variables, we deduce an “equality” such that one
side of the “equality” is a probability, but the other side is not. For probability measures induced by
extended random variables, we deduce an “equality” such that its two sides are unequal probabilities.
Known paradoxes in mathematics are either considered issues of formal logic (such as Russell’s paradox),
or treated as deducible statements which are counterintuitive but true (e.g., see [6, 14]), where “true”
implies “without contradiction”. Regarding deducible statements as results without contradiction is
not grounded on mathematical justification; it originates from a popular belief, i.e., mathematics is free
from contradiction as it is. The belief is an issue of mathematical philosophy (e.g., see [3]), which is not
our concern. Unlike the paradoxes treated in [6, 14] or discussed by logicians, the inconsistency found
in measure-theoretic probability cannot be explained away.
In the rest of this article, we first deliberate why the limit of a convergent sequence from the interval
[0, 1] may not necessarily be a limit probability, even if the terms of the sequence are all probabilities.
After showing how to decide whether a limit probability can be calculated as the limit of a sequence
of probabilities (Section 2), we review briefly the notion of tightness of probability measures induced
by random variables (Section 3). Tightness is a condition to prevent mass from “escaping to infinity”
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[4, 11]. With a tight sequence of measures, we construct a sequence of measures which is not tight, and
then reveal the inconsistency of measure-theoretic probability (Section 4). The inconsistency is relevant
to infinite additivity, which is one of the basic assumptions in probability theory [8]. Next, we clarify
an ambiguity caused by the assumption of infinite additivity (Section 5). Because of this assumption,
the meaning of “a realizable event” is ambiguous. Clearly, abstract properties of mathematical entities
in theoretical thinking are not necessarily properties of physical quantities observed in the real world.
However, misled by the assumption of infinite additivity, some people might mistake the former for the
latter; as a result, they might give problematic or even incorrect interpretations of random phenomena
observed in experiments with microscopic systems. We discuss this issue in the context of an exper-
iment in quantum physics (Section 6). Finally, we explain why measure-theoretic probability can be
so successful even though it is not a consistent theory, and discuss briefly how to avoid undesirable
consequences caused by the inconsistency (Section 7). Actually the inconsistency is due to the notion
of “numbers” adopted in conventional mathematics. A possible way to resolve the inconsistency is to
treat “numbers” from the point of view of constructive mathematics (e.g., see [5, 12]).
2 Limit Probability Measure and Limit Probability
In measure-theoretic probability, random experiments are described by probability measures together
with the corresponding measurable spaces. However, when concerned with values and probability dis-
tributions of random variables, we can make no mention of the underlying measurable spaces associated
with experiments. Let P be a probability measure on a measurable space (Ω,A). Denote by R the
σ-algebra of Borel subsets of the real line R which is equipped with the topology induced by the usual
metric. Let F be a family of probability measures induced by random variables defined on Ω measur-
able A/R. As the probability distributions of the random variables on Ω, members of F may simply
be regarded as measures defined on the measurable space (R,R). We do not need to specify F or
Ω. It suffices to know that random variables with their measures belonging to F are defined on a
common sample space Ω. Not all measures on (R,R) are members of F , however. Apparently, there
are measures on (R,R) induced by irrelevant random variables which are not defined on the sample
space Ω.
Let (ρn)n≥1 be a sequence of probability measures induced by real-valued random variables. If
(ρn)n≥1 converges weakly, denote by ρ the weak limit of (ρn)n≥1 where ρ is a probability measure on
R. Such convergence means that, as n→∞∫
R
fdρn →
∫
R
fdρ
for every bounded, continuous function f on R [4, 11]. For probability measures ρ, ρ1, ρ2, · · · induced
respectively by random variables V, V1, V2, · · · , if ρn converges weakly to ρ, Vn is said to converge in
distribution to V . If random variables U and V have the same distribution, Vn also converges in
distribution to U [11]. The random variables V, V1, V2, · · · and U may be defined on distinct probability
spaces [4].
If a sequence (ρn)n≥1 converges weakly to ρ, and if not only the terms ρn but also the weak limit ρ
belong to F , we call ρ the limit probability measure of (ρn)n≥1. For a limit probability measure ρ and
an event (measurable set) E ∈ R, we call ρ(E) a limit probability. For every α ∈ F , there is a sequence
(αn)n≥1 of measures from F such that αn = α for all n. Hence α is the limit probability measure of
(αn)n≥1. So a probability α(E) is trivially a limit probability. The presupposition of equality implies
that, if one side of an equality represents a probability, so does the other side, and operations performed
on the two sides must obey the same rules for calculating probabilities. If ρ is the limit probability
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measure of (ρn)n≥1, we also write ρ = [limn ρn], where the brackets cannot be omitted. Accordingly,
ρ(E) = [limn ρn](E). With [limn ρn] as a synonym for the limit probability measure ρ, we want to
emphasize that rules for calculating limit probabilities and rules for calculating limits of real sequences
are different. Usually, a convergent real sequence from the interval [0, 1] may not necessarily converge to
a probability, even if the terms of the sequence are all probabilities. But there is an exception: the limit
of a real sequence may “coincide” with a limit probability. We shall explain what this means shortly.
Whenever we say “events En ∈ R form a sequence (En)n≥1”, we assume that, for a given E1 ∈ R,
there is a map H : R 7→ R which defines En, n > 1 recursively as follows:
E2 = H(E1), E3 = H(E2) = H(H(E1) = H
(2)(E1), · · · , En = H
(n−1)(E1)
and as n → ∞, En tends to a limit event E = limnH
(n)(E1). An example of such H is the identity
map, which maps any given E1 ∈ R to E1 itself. If H is not the identity map, the limit event E may
or may not be a set in R.
We are interested in measures ρn ∈ F , n = 1, 2, · · · , such that for events En in (En)n≥1, the
probabilities ρn(En) form a convergent sequence. We denote the limit of (ρn(En))n≥1 by limn[ρn(En)]
rather than limn ρn(En). The meaning of limn ρn(En) is ambiguous. For instance, suppose that En
tends to a limit event E and ρn converges weakly to ρ in a generalized sense as explained in Remark
2 (see Section 3). Then limn ρn(En) may mean either ρ(E) or limn[ρn(En)]. The former is always a
probability; but the latter may or may not be a probability. The use of symbols “limn[ρn(En)]” and
“[limn ρn](E)” may help one avoid mixing up rules for calculating limits of real sequences with rules
for calculating limit probabilities. When limn[ρn(En)] is not a probability, it is still the limit of a real
sequence.
Example 1. For n = 1, 2, · · · , let δn be the Dirac measure concentrated on En = {n} and let ρn = δn,
where ρn is the probability measure induced by a degenerate random variable Wn = n. Since
δn({n}) = P(Wn = n) = 1
for each n, one may treat δn({n}), n = 1, 2, · · · as a sequence of 1’s. Such treatment implies
lim
n→∞
[δn({n})] = 1.
By definition, limn[δn({n})] is the trivial limit of a constant sequence. Since δn does not converge weakly
to a limit defined on R, limn[δn({n})] is not a limit probability. The events En, n > 1 associated with
ρn(En) are defined by H : R 7→ R such that
En = H({n − 1}) = {n}
with E1 = {1}. Evidently, (En)n≥1 has no limit in R for limnH
(n)({1}) = {∞} 6∈ R. Colloquially, one
may also express this fact by saying that all the mass “escapes to infinity” as n→∞. 
When the limit event E is inR and the limit probability measure [limn ρn] exists where [limn ρn] ∈ F
by definition, we say that [limn ρn](E) “coincides” with limn[ρn(En)], if they not only have the same
numerical value but also satisfy the presupposition of equality, which requires limn[ρn(En)] to be a
probability. In other words, by “[limn ρn](E) and limn[ρn(En)] coincide” we mean that not only
[ lim
n→∞
ρn](E) = lim
n→∞
[ρn(En)] (1)
holds but also both sides of (1) are probabilities.
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Remark 1. Suppose that, as n → ∞, three sequences different in kind, i.e., a sequence of measures
ρn ∈ F , a sequence of events En ∈ R, and a sequence of probabilities ρn(En) approach their respective
limits: [limn ρn], a limit probability measure; E, a limit event; and limn[ρn(En)], the limit of a real
sequence (ρn(En))n≥1. As a result, corresponding to ρn(En), there exist a limit of a real sequence
limn[ρn(En)] and a limit probability [limn ρn](E). If [limn ρn](E) and limn[ρn(En)] coincide, the limit
probability can also be calculated as the limit of the real sequence; otherwise the limit probability must
be calculated as the probability assigned by measure [limn ρn] to event E. 
Example 2. For n = 1, 2, · · · , write δ1/n for the Dirac measure concentrated on {1/n} and let ρn = δ1/n,
where ρn is the probability measure induced by a degenerate random variable Qn = 1/n. Let H : R 7→ R
be the identity map which defines En = E1 for all n > 1 with E1 = (−∞, 0]. For each n,
δ1/n(En) = δ1/n(E1) = P(Qn ∈ E1) = 0.
By treating δ1/n(E1), n = 1, 2, · · · as a sequence of 0’s, one has
lim
n→∞
[δ1/n(E1)] = 0.
The above trivial limit of the constant sequence is not a limit probability. Actually [limn δ1/n] = δ0,
where δ0 is the Dirac measure concentrated on {0}. So [limn δ1/n](E1) = 1, which does not coincide
with limn[δ1/n(E1)]. 
Example 3. For En and ρn defined in Example 1 and Example 2, respectively, when n > 1,
ρn(En) = δ1/n({n}) = P(Qn = n) = 0.
As we already know, limnH
(n)({1}) = {∞} 6∈ R. Clearly
lim
n→∞
[ρn(En)] = 0
has nothing to do with calculating a limit probability. 
The simple examples given above involve only measures induced by degenerate random variables.
Actually, even for a convergent sequence (ρ′n(E
′
n))n≥1 of probabilities, where ρ
′
n, n = 1, 2, · · · are all
induced by non-degenerate random variables, the limit of (ρ′n(E
′
n))n≥1 may not necessarily be a proba-
bility, see Example 5 in the next section.
Let (ρn)n≥1 be a sequence of measures from F such that [limn ρn] = ρ ∈ F . In other words, ρ is
the limit probability measure of (ρn)n≥1. For a given E1 ∈ R, let En, n > 1 be defined by H : R 7→ R
recursively, such that limnH
(n)(E1) = E ∈ R. Similarly, let E
′
n, n > 1 be defined recursively by
H ′ : R 7→ R with E′ = limnH
′(n)(E′1) ∈ R where E
′
1 ∈ R is given, and let (ρ
′
n)n≥1 be a sequence of
measures from F . We have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Assume that the three conditions (a), (b) and (c) below are all satisfied. (a) As n→∞,
|ρn(En)− ρ
′
n(E
′
n)| → 0,
(b) limn[ρn(En)] coincides with [limn ρn](E), and (c) measure-theoretic probability is a consistent theory.
Then limn[ρ
′
n(E
′
n)] is a probability.
Proof. Condition (a) implies limn[ρn(En)] = limn[ρ
′
n(E
′
n)], which together with condition (b) implies
ρ(E) = limn[ρ
′
n(E
′
n)]. The result to be proved then follows from condition (c) and the presupposition
of equality.
The above lemma is equivalent to its contrapositive. We shall use the contrapositive of Lemma 1 to
reveal the inconsistency of measure-theoretic probability.
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3 Tightness of Probability Measures
The sequence of the Dirac measures (δn)n≥1 induced by the degenerate random variables Wn = n
in Example 1 illustrates a simple scenario of mass “escaping to infinity”. Escape of mass also happens
to sequences of probability measures induced by non-degenerate random variables.
Example 4. Let (µn)n≥1 be a sequence of probability measures induced by random variables Zn. For
any given n, the probability mass function of Zn is determined by µn as follows.
µn({j}) = P(Zn = j) =
{
(1− q)qn−j , j = 1, 2, · · · , n− 1
1− q + qn, j = n
(2)
where 0 < q < 1. As n → ∞, all the mass generated by (2) will “escape to infinity”. For any given
j < n, limn[µn({j})] = limn(1 − q)qn−j = 0. For j = n, µn({n}) = 1− q + qn is the mass at n. When
j = n − k where 1 ≤ k < n is fixed, µn({n − k}) = (1 − q)q
k is the mass at n− k. Similar to the unit
mass at n expressed by the Dirac measure δn, the non-vanishing part 1− q of the mass 1− q + q
n at n
and the mass (1− q)qk at n− k will all “escape to infinity” as n→∞. So
(1− q) + (1− q)
∑
k≥1
qk = 1
is the total escaped mass. 
Example 5. As shown in the previous example, (µn)n≥1 has no limit probability measure on R because
of escape of mass. From (2) we see that, for each n, the probability of {Zn = n} is
P(Zn = n) = µn({n}) = 1− q + q
n.
Since (1− q + qn)n≥1 is a convergent sequence,
lim
n→∞
[µn({n})] = lim
n→∞
(1− q + qn) = 1− q.
However, as partial mass “escaped to infinity”, limn[µn({n})] is not a probability. Similarly, the prob-
ability of {Zn < n} is
P(Zn < n) = µn(E
′
n) = 1− P(Zn = n) = 1− µn({n}) = q − q
n (3)
where a map H ′ : R 7→ R defines
E′n = H
′(E′n−1) = E
′
n−1 ∪ [n− 1, n) = (−∞, n), n > 1
recursively with E′1 = (−∞, 1). As one can readily see,
E′ = lim
n→∞
H ′(n)(E′1) = R ∈ R. (4)
But
lim
n→∞
[µn(E
′
n)] = limn→∞
(q − qn) = q
is also part of escaped mass rather than a probability. 
Let (ρn)n≥1 be a sequence of probability measures defined on R. Tightness is a condition imposed
on (ρn)n≥1 to prevent escape of mass. If (ρn)n≥1 is tight, then for each ǫ > 0, there is an interval Iǫ ⊂ R,
such that supn ρn(I
c
ǫ ) < ǫ where I
c
ǫ = R \ Iǫ.
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Example 6. Consider probability measures µn induced by Zn in Example 4. For each n, Zn+1 takes
larger values with larger probabilities. The values of Zn+1 include n + 1 and all the values of Zn.
The sequence (µn)n≥1 is not tight. To see this, consider ǫ = 1 − q. By (2), for all n, µn({n}) =
1 − q + q−n > 1 − q. In particular, for all real numbers b > 0 and for all n > Nb, µn({n}) > 1 − q,
where Nb is the smallest integer larger than or equal to b. Consequently, for each interval Ib = (−∞, b),
supn µn(I
c
b ) > 1− q. The probability mass function (2) explains not only why (µn)n≥1 fails to be tight
but also where all the mass goes as shown in Example 4. 
Tightness is necessary but not sufficient for (ρn)n≥1 to converge weakly to a limit defined on R.
However, if (ρn)n≥1 has a weak limit on R, then (ρn)n≥1 is tight.
Example 7. Denote by λ and λn the probability measures induced by independent and identically dis-
tributed Bernoulli random variables X and Xn, n = 1, 2, · · · , respectively. The above random variables
are all defined on a common sample space Ω. The probability mass function of Xn is
λn({a}) = P(Xn = a) =
{
q, a = 0
1− q, a = 1
(5)
where 0 < q < 1. The sequence (λn)n≥1 converges weakly to λ. Let E1 = {a} and H : R 7→ R
be the identity map which defines En = {a} for all n > 1. So limnH
(n)(E1) = {a}. Apparently,
[limn λn]({a}) = λ({a}) which coincides with limn[λn({a})], and (λn)n≥1 is tight. 
Example 8. Let Xn, n = 1, 2, · · · be the Bernoulli random variables in Example 7. Denote by Yn the
largest among X1,X2, · · · ,Xn.
Yn = max{Xj : j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}}, n = 1, 2, · · · . (6)
Let γn be the probability measures induced by Yn. The probability mass function of Yn is
γn({a}) = P(Yn = a) =
{
qn, a = 0
1− qn, a = 1.
The sequence (γn)n≥1 converges weakly to γ where γ is given by
γ({a}) =
{
0, a = 0
1, a = 1
i.e., γ is the Dirac measure δ1 concentrated on {1}. Evidently (γn)n≥1 is tight, and [limn γn]({a}) =
γ({a}) which coincides with limn[γn({a})]. 
Remark 2. By replacing F with a larger family F ⊃ F and modifying the definition of weak conver-
gence accordingly, the definitions of limit probability measure and limit probability may be generalized
[10]. The extended real line R and the σ-algebra R of subsets of R constitute a measurable space
(R,R). The members of F are probability measures defined on (R,R) and induced by extended ran-
dom variables (on a common sample space Ω) which may take ±∞ as their values. Of course no mass
will be assigned to {±∞} by any measures in F . But positive probabilities can be assigned to {±∞}
by measures in F \ F . Suppose that a sequence (ρn)n≥1 of measures from F converges weakly to a
measure ρ ∈ F . By the generalized definitions, ρ is the limit probability measure of (ρn)n≥1 and ρ(E)
a limit probability where E ∈ R, even if ρ 6∈ F . We still write ρ = [limn ρn] to avoid confusion of limit
probabilities and limits of sequences from the interval [0, 1]. 
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Example 9. By the original definitions, (µn)n≥1 in Example 5 has no limit probability measure because
of “mass escaping to infinity”. However, according to the generalized definitions, the limit probability
measure [limn µn] of (µn)n≥1 is the Dirac measure concentrated on {∞} induced by an extended (degen-
erate) random variable Z =∞. As part of mass at {∞}, limn[µn(E
′
n)] is not a probability. In contrast
to limn[µn(E
′
n)], [limn µn](E
′) is a probability where E′ = R, see (4). In other words, calculated as the
value of [limn µn] at E
′ = R, [limn µn](R) = 0 is the limit probability corresponding to µn(E
′
n). 
4 The Inconsistency
With a tight sequence of measures from F , we can construct a sequence of measures which is also
from F but not tight. The two sequences of measures are both induced by non-degenerate random
variables.
Example 10. In terms of random variables Xn and Yn in Example 7 and Example 8, respectively, we
may construct random variables Zn as follows.
Zn = max{j : Xj = Yn, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}}, n = 1, 2, · · · . (7)
For j ≤ n, there may be more than one j’s such that Xj = Yn. The value of Zn is the largest of such j.
Let µn be the probability measures induced by Zn. As we can readily see, for 1 ≤ j < n,
{Zn = j} = {Xj = 1} ∩ {Xi = 0, j < i ≤ n}
and
{Zn = n} = {Xn = 1} ∪ {Xi = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , n} = {Xn = 1} ∪ {Yn = 0}.
So the probability mass function of Zn is the same as (2) with q being the probability of {Xn = 0}
given by λn, see (5). From Example 6, (µn)n≥1 is not tight, though it is constructed based on a tight
sequence (λn)n≥1. 
As shown by the lemma below, an “equality” in measure-theoretic probability can be deduced, such
that one side of the “equality” is a probability but the other side is not. Consider (λn)n≥1 and (µn)n≥1,
where λn and µn are the probability measures induced by Xn and Zn, respectively (see Example 7 and
(7) in Example 10).
Lemma 2. The following expression
λ({0}) = lim
n→∞
[µn(E
′
n)] (8)
is deducible, where λ = [limn λn], λ({0}) is the probability of “a single Bernoulli trial fails”, and
E′n = (−∞, n). But limn[µn(E
′
n)] is not a probability.
Proof. For n = 1, 2, · · · , {Xn = 0} = {Zn < n} ∪ {Yn = 0} and {Zn < n} ∩ {Yn = 0} = ∅, where Yn is
given by (6). So {Xn = 0} \ {Yn = 0} = {Zn < n} and
P({Xn = 0} \ {Yn = 0}) = P(Xn = 0)− P(Yn = 0) = P(Zn < n). (9)
The left-hand side of the first equality in (9) is the probability of {Xn = 0} \ {Yn = 0}, i.e., “the n
th
trial fails but not every trial up to the nth one fails”. This event is characterized by Xn and Yn so
its probability can be calculated by λn and γn, i.e., P(Xn = 0) = λn({0}) and P(Yn = 0) = γn({0}),
where γn is the probability measure induced by Yn. The right-hand side of the last equality in (9) is
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the probability of {Zn < n}, i.e., “for some j < n the j
th trial succeeds but the (j + k)th trial fails for
each k = 1, 2, · · · , n− j”. This event is characterized by Zn and hence its probability can be calculated
by µn, i.e., P(Zn < n) = µn(E
′
n), see (3). Therefore
λn({0}) − γn({0}) = µn(E
′
n), n = 1, 2, · · · . (10)
Letting n→∞ on both sides of (10) gives (8). Note that limn[λn({0})] = [limn λn]({0}) = λ({0}) and
limn[γn({0})] = [limn γn]({0}) = γ({0}) = 0 where γ = [limn γn] (see Examples 7 and 8). The event
associated with the probability λ({0}) is {X = 0}, where X is a Bernoulli random variable identically
distributed as Xn. However, as part of mass “escaped to infinity”, limn[µn(E
′
n)] is not a probability
(see Examples 4 and 5).
A mathematical theory is inconsistent if an expression x = y is deduced in the theory, such that
either (i) the expression violates the presupposition of equality, or (ii) x and y are numerically different.
The deduced expression is erroneous only when the theory is proved to be contradiction-free as requested
by Hilbert. According to Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, measure-theoretic probability is one
of the theories for which such a proof does not exist. By Lemma 2, (8) is deducible in measure-theoretic
probability, which implies that the theory is not consistent as (8) violates the presupposition of equality.
Theorem 1. The mathematical theory of probability (i.e., measure-theoretic probability) is inconsistent.
Proof. Either of the two cases below shows that measure-theoretic probability is inconsistent.
(I) For probability measures induced by real-valued random variables, Lemma 1 is equivalent to its
contrapositive, i.e., if limn[ρ
′
n(E
′
n)] is not a probability, then at least one of the conditions (a), (b) and
(c) in the lemma cannot be satisfied. Let λn({0}) and µn(E
′
n) in (10) play the roles of ρn(En) and
ρ′n(E
′
n) in Lemma 1, respectively. By (10) and Example 8, as n→∞,
|λn({0}) − µn(E
′
n)| = γn({0})→ 0.
So condition (a) is satisfied. As shown in Example 7, [limn λn]({0}) coincides with limn[λn({0})]. Thus
condition (b) is satisfied, too. By Lemma 2, (8) is deducible but limn[µn(E
′
n)] is not a probability. From
the contrapositive of Lemma 1, condition (c) does not hold.
(II) For probability measures induced by extended random variables, we calculate the limit proba-
bilities on both sides of (10). The limit probabilities on the two sides of (10) are [limn λn]({0}) = q and
[limn µn](R) = 0 (see Remark 2 and Example 9), respectively. So the resultant expression is q = 0.
To defend measure-theoretic probability, someone might say: “λ({0}) and limn[µn(E
′
n)] are the
same pure number, and (8) is just a tautology derived in a theory of pure numbers.” Measure-theoretic
probability is not a theory of pure numbers, however. Evidently, λ({0}) is a probability, and should
not be treated as a pure number. In Section 1, we have already explained why probabilities and pure
numbers are quantities of different kinds.
In the literature, it has been postulated that measure-theoretic probability is a consistent theory.
However, the postulated consistency of measure-theoretic probability appears to be incompatible with
the presupposition of equality. Actually, it is the condition of countable additivity imposed on proba-
bility measures that leads to the contradiction. By definition, the probability measure P is σ-additive,
i.e., it satisfies the assumption of countable additivity. Clearly, if the restriction of countable additivity
is removed, then the inconsistency disappears. The inconsistency revealed for the σ-additive measure
indicates that countable additivity is relevant to the inconsistency. Moreover, because of the assumption
of countable additivity, the meaning of “a realizable event” is ambiguous. We shall clarify the ambiguity
caused by countable additivity in the next section.
9
5 Infinite Additivity and Ideal Events
For a probability measure P and an infinite sequence (Bn)n≥1 of mutually exclusive events with
P(Bn) > 0 for all n, countable additivity requires
P(∪n≥1Bn) =
∑
n≥1
P(Bn)
and amounts to infinite additivity. In a nontrivial way, the assumption of infinite additivity implies that
the system of events, which includes infinitely many, mutually exclusive events of positive probabilities,
is closed under the formation of infinite unions and intersections. An event expressed by infinite unions
or intersections is an ideal event. Relying on infinitely many operations in an infeasible experiment,
ideal events will not occur in the real world. Nevertheless, such events may still be logically conceivable.
Since measure-theoretic probability is sufficiently far developed, it seems that the success of the theory
might be able to justify the assumption of infinite additivity [7].
No doubt measure-theoretic probability is very successful in various applications. However, the
success of the theory cannot justify the assumption of infinite additivity. For an infinite sequence
(Bn)n≥1 of mutually exclusive events with P(Bn) > 0 for all n, the meaning of “Bn is realizable” is
ambiguous. As long as the probability of an event is positive, no matter how small it may be, the
frequency of occurrence of the event cannot remain zero forever, and hence the event will be observed
at least once in an actual experiment. In this sense the event is considered realizable. But not all of the
events Bn, n = 1, 2, · · · are realizable in the above sense, since the number of events corresponding to
observable phenomena in any actual experiment is always finite. Therefore, even if P(Bn) > 0 for all n
by assumption, there always exists an infinite subsequence of (Bn)n≥1, such that the occurrence of any
event in the subsequence is only logically conceivable but not practically observable; otherwise there
would be an instance of an infinite set observed in the real world, which is absurd. So the meaning
of “Bn is realizable” (as implied by P(Bn) > 0) is not the same for all events in (Bn)n≥1. In fact,
only for a finite number of events, “realizable” means “practically observable in an actual experiment”.
For infinitely many events, the meaning of “realizable” is “logically conceivable but not practically
observable in any actual experiment”. The ambiguity is due to the assumption of infinite additivity.
To avoid confusion due to the ambiguity, by “a realizable (or real) event” we mean “an event
which is practically observable in an actual experiment”. In contrast to real events, we call an event
“conceivable (or ideal)” if a positive probability is assigned to it but the event cannot be observed in
any actual experiment. If one wants to acquire knowledge about the physical world by experiment, it
is necessary to distinguish between real events and conceivable events; otherwise abstract properties
of mathematical entities might be mistaken for properties of the physical world. As illustrated by
the following two examples, abstract properties obtained by theoretical thinking are not necessarily
knowledge conveyed by real events.
Example 11. Consider a sequence of binomial random variables Vn, n = 1, 2, · · · with probabilities
P(Vn = k) =
(
n
k
)
pkn(1− pn)
n−k, k = 0, 1, · · · , n.
According to Poisson’s theorem, as n→∞, if pn → 0 in such a way that npn → c > 0, then
lim
n→∞
P(Vn = k) =
cke−c
k!
, k = 0, 1 · · · .
The right-hand side of the above equality is the distribution of a Poisson random variable V . By
definition, V takes every nonnegative integer as its value with a positive probability. The Poisson
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distribution can be used to calculate approximately the probabilities of {Vn = k}, k = 0, 1, · · · , n for the
binomial random variables. Although a positive probability is assigned to each of {V = k}, k = 0, 1, · · ·
for the Poisson random variable, it is impossible for all of such events {V = k} to be observed in the
physical world. 
The foundation of conventional mathematics is Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice
(ZFC). As a notion in conventional mathematics, the set of nonnegative integers may be obtained by
the axiom of infinity in ZFC. However, mathematical entities such as sets consisting of infinitely many
elements do not exist physically and cannot be observed by experiment. No instance of such entities
can be found in the real world.
Example 12. Let U be a continuous random variable with range R and probability density function g
such that g(x) > 0 for any x ∈ R. Random variables with normal distributions are well-known instances
of such U . By the properties of pure numbers, on the real line, there are infinitely many disjoint intervals
In of positive lengths, n = 1, 2, · · · , i.e., ∪n≥1In ⊂ R and In ∩ In′ = ∅ if n 6= n
′. From the property of
the continuous random variable, for each n,
P(U ∈ In) =
∫
x∈In
g(x)dx > 0.
However, only a finite number of {U ∈ In} are realizable. Infinitely many of {U ∈ In} are unrealizable,
even though a positive probability is assigned to {U ∈ In} for every n. 
From the point of view of pure mathematics, it is not necessary for a continuous random variable
to represent any quantity in the physical world [9]. Actually, dividing a continuous physical quantity
into infinitely many parts is not feasible, though it might be theoretically conceivable. However, when
modeling a continuous physical quantity by a continuous random variable, some people might naively
believe that, as a result of probability assignment based on the assumption of infinite additivity, infinitely
many events, such as those modeled by {U ∈ In}, n = 1, 2, · · · in Example 12, are not only conceivable
but also realizable. Because of such misunderstanding, someone might even fail to differentiate abstract
properties of pure numbers (which constitute a mathematical continuum) from properties of continuous
physical quantities. We shall further discuss this issue and some other related issues in the next section.
6 Continuous Parameters and Microscopic Systems
The mathematical continuum is a notion in pure mathematics, and cannot be observed in realizable
events. For a continuous physical quantity modeled by a continuous random variable, it is impossible to
pick a precise value out of its range by measurement. On the real line, strictly between any two different
pure numbers there is another. But all pure numbers are distinguishable by definition. In general, any
two different points of a topological space, such as two pure numbers on the real line, can be separated
in mathematical reasoning, so long as the topological space satisfies the separation axioms, which are
generalizations of properties of metric spaces (e.g., see [13]). However, as shown by Example 12 in
the previous section, the mathematical properties of pure numbers cannot be attached to continuous
physical quantities, even though they are modeled by continuous random variables. Consequently, there
is no way to measure continuous physical quantities arbitrarily accurately, regardless of whether or
not the measurements are subject to the constraints imposed by the uncertainty relations in quantum
mechanics.
For the same reason, if a continuous physical quantity is modeled by a continuous parameter to be
adjusted for an actual experiment or measurement, and if values of the parameter are specified with an
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apparatus, then the apparatus cannot yield any precise value of the parameter. In fact, what can be
specified with the apparatus are uncertain intervals if the parameter is real-valued, or uncertain regions
if the parameter takes its values from a metric space which may not necessarily be the real line. Such
uncertain intervals (or regions) are an intrinsic characteristic of modeling continuous physical quantities.
As a result, it is impossible to repeat an actual experiment or measurement under the same condition
described by a precisely specified value of a continuous parameter.
Example 13. Let a0+ϕ represent a value of a continuous parameter, where a0 is a nonnegative integer
and ϕ in the interval [0, 1). Suppose we want to specify ϕ precisely, which amounts to defining a singleton
set {ϕ}. Every pure number r ∈ [0, 1) has a precise expression in the form of decimal expansion
r =
∞∑
n=1
rn
10n
= 0.r1r2 · · · .
Theoretically, {ϕ} can be defined by specifying all of the digits a1, a2, · · · of ϕ.
{ϕ} =
{
x ∈ [0, 1) : x =
∞∑
n=1
rn
10n
, rn = an, n = 1, 2, · · ·
}
.
However, it is impossible to select any precise value from the interval [0, 1) in practical applications.
Involving infinitely many digits, the defining property (i.e., rn = an, n = 1, 2, · · · ) of {ϕ} cannot
be used to specify ϕ for an actual experiment or measurement. Only the first m digits of ϕ, i.e.,
rn = an, n = 1, 2, · · · ,m can be stated explicitly. The condition rn = an where 1 ≤ n ≤ m is weaker
than that required by the precise expression of ϕ, and defines an uncertain interval
[βm, ψm) =
{
x ∈ [0, 1) : x =
∞∑
n=1
rn
10n
, rn = an, 1 ≤ n ≤ m
}
which contains ϕ, where βm = 0.a1a2 · · · am and ψm = 0.a1a2 · · · (am + 1). All digits rm+k, k = 1, 2, · · ·
of every x ∈ (βm, ψm) are unspecified. Since ψm > βm for any positive integer m, the uncertain
interval is always a set with the cardinality of the continuum, though its length ψm − βm = 10
−m can
be very small for large m. If an actual experiment or measurement relies on specifying values of such a
continuous parameter, only uncertain intervals in the range of the parameter can be specified. 
Example 14. In connection with the preceding example, consider a partial sum
∑
1≤n≤m an10
−n. One
may use this partial sum as an approximation to ϕ in numerical calculation. Such an approximation
also implies selection of a precise value βm from the interval [0, 1). The digits in the decimal expansion
of βm are rn = an for 1 ≤ n ≤ m and rn = 0 for n > m. Just like ϕ, the number βm cannot
be specified in practical applications. As shown in Example 13, pure numbers in the interval [0, 1)
given by their decimal expansions (or any other forms of precise expressions) are merely theoretically
conceivable; they are useless for an actual experiment or measurement. No apparatus in the real world
has an infinite resolution to manipulate infinitely many digits. Setting r = 0 amounts to setting all of
its digits rn = 0, n = 1, 2, · · · . Such a task is not practically achievable. Similarly, for the number βm
corresponding to the partial sum
∑
1≤n≤m an10
−n, it is impossible to put all the digits rn = 0 where
n = m+ 1,m+ 2, · · · . In other words, one cannot pick βm out of the interval [0, 1) with an apparatus.
Since βn is an endpoint of the uncertain interval [βm, ψm), this example actually shows that, in practical
applications, it is even impossible to specify endpoints of intervals with certainty. Generally speaking,
characterized by uncertain regions, such uncertainty in modeling continuous physical quantities differs
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from randomness studied by probability theory. In measure-theoretic probability, by assumption, the
boundary of a region in a metric space (such as the endpoints of an interval on the real line) can be
specified precisely; a value of a continuous parameter may be said to lie in a region which is completely
determined by its boundary; a probability may be assigned to such a region to describe randomness
due to incapability of choosing a value from a continuous range. However, uncertainty in modeling
continuous physical quantities cannot be captured in this way, since the boundary itself cannot be
specified precisely. 
Remark 3. In experiments with macroscopic systems, or in thought experiments which are not per-
formed in the physical world, distinction between precise values and uncertain regions may be unnec-
essary. However, confusing uncertain regions with precisely specified values of continuous parameters
may lead to undesirable consequences, such as misinterpreting random phenomena observed in actual
experiments with microscopic systems. 
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Figure 1. Experiment with polarized photons.
Example 15. Photons in a linearly polarized beam produced by polarizer A arrive at polarizer B. The
angle (a continuous physical quantity) between the transmission axes of the two polarizers is modeled
by a continuous parameter θ (Figure 1). The intensity of the beam originating from A can be reduced
so that only one photon at a time arrives at B. For a specified value of θ, when arriving at B, a photon
may or may not get through the polarizer. The transmission probability is cos2 θ for each photon in
the beam. Since the initial conditions are considered identical for all photons leaving A and striking
B, according to quantum mechanics, the behavior of individual photons observed in the experiment is
ontologically stochastic (e.g., see [1]).
The above quantum-mechanical interpretation implies an assumption: values of a continuous pa-
rameter (i.e., θ) can be specified precisely in the experiment. But a seemingly precisely specified value
of θ is actually an uncertain interval. Moreover, the direction of motion of a photon is also described by
a continuous (vector-valued) parameter, and hence cannot be specified precisely. A seemingly precisely
specified direction of motion for photons in the beam is actually a tiny 3-dimensional uncertain region in
the range of the vector parameter. As a result, photons in the same beam may not necessarily move in
the same direction. Abstract properties of mathematical entities (such as vectors) are highly idealized
descriptions of the behavior of their physical counterparts (such as beams of light). For photons arriving
at B, the initial conditions described by the continuous parameters cannot be specified precisely, and
hence are not necessarily identical. Lack of knowledge about the initial conditions appears relevant to
the observed random behavior of the photons. It is still controversial and even problematic to interpret
the random behavior of the photons as a consequence of natural law. 
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7 Concluding Remarks
Bernoulli trials have widespread applications to the world around us. To describe Bernoulli trials in
measure-theoretic probability, one uses a sequence of probability spaces (Ωn,An,Pn), n = 1, 2, · · · . For
a fixed n, (Ωn,An,Pn) is called a Bernoulli scheme, which is the probabilistic model of an experiment
consisting of n independent trials, and each trial has two possible outcomes. Although the number
of operations required by the experiment is finite, it is difficult to use such models when n is large.
Based on the assumption of infinite additivity, one can obtain an ideal probabilistic model (Ω,A,P)
which corresponds to the limit case of the Bernoulli schemes as n→∞. The probability space (Ω,A,P)
describes an ideal experiment which has infinitely many outcomes. This ideal experiment consists of an
infinite number of Bernoulli trials and hence requires infinitely many operations. As we have shown,
(Ω,A,P) implies the inconsistency of measure-theoretic probability, and the assumption of infinite
additivity may result in confusion of ideal events and real events.
Probabilistic models of ideal experiments are very useful for calculating probabilities of real events
approximately. Observed frequencies of occurrence of real events can be in good agreement with re-
sults obtained by such approximation. The use of ideal models in the above sense will obviously be
unobjectionable from an empirical point of view [8]. However, conceivable events with assigned positive
probabilities should not be mixed up with real events. For measure-theoretic probability, the ultimate
criterion of success is whether predicted probabilities of real events in various practical applications can
be verified empirically. The criterion implies a constraint: Since ideal events do not exist physically,
or since it is impossible to verify the existence of ideal events in the physical world, physical existence
of abstract properties derived by manipulating probabilities of ideal events should not be inferred from
experiments. This constraint functions as a “firewall” of measure-theoretic probability in applications.
When the constraint is satisfied, it is safe to apply measure-theoretic probability to solve problems in the
real world, which may explain why measure-theoretic probability can be so successful even if it is not a
consistent theory. In practice, however, violating the constraint may lead to undesirable consequences,
such as mistaking a physically non-existing property of a mathematical notion for an ontological reality.
A typical violation is to use experimental data to “prove” or “verify” physical existence of abstract
properties of mathematical entities which have no instances in the physical world.
The inconsistency found in measure-theoretic probability appears merely in the theory, and will not
affect practical applications as long as ideal events in the theory are not mistaken for observable events in
the real world. Nevertheless, the inconsistency must be resolved. Physical quantities are usually modeled
by mathematical entities. If one wants to measure or specify a continuous physical quantity as accurately
as possible, one needs to model it by a continuous quantity in mathematics. A continuous mathematical
quantity can be divided into “infinitely” many parts. But the word “infinite” has different meanings
in conventional mathematics and in constructive mathematics (e.g., see [5, 12]). Measure-theoretic
probability is a branch of the former. The notion of “infinite” adopted in conventional mathematics
not only causes confusion of ideal events and real events, but also leads to the inconsistency eventually.
Because of the assumption of infinite additivity in measure-theoretic probability, some people might
mix up abstract properties of mathematical entities in theoretical thinking with properties of physical
quantities observed in the real world; as a result, they might be misguided to give problematic or
even wrong interpretations of random phenomena observed in experiments with microscopic systems.
However, abstract properties of mathematical entities (such as infinite sets) are not necessarily properties
of their physical counterparts, and hence should not be attached to physical quantities. Hopefully, the
inconsistency may be resolved by treating “numbers” and “infinite” from the viewpoint of constructive
mathematics.
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